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What is new?








- New Paper (July 2008): The Welfare Consequences of Monetary Policy and the Role of the Labor Market: a Tax Interpretation
- Revised Paper (July 2008): How to distinguish bad policies from bad luck
- Revised Paper: (June 2008): Vacancies, Unemployment and the Phillips Curve

- Invited Papers and Conference Discussions
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Conferences and Workshops








   







Research organized by topics

- Optimal monetary policy








- European Monetary Union and Open economy monetary policy







- Inflation dynamics and DSGE modeling






- Financial and currency crises






- Invited papers, Comments and Conference discussions

Optimal monetary policy








Optimal Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel joint with Carl Walsh
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 53 n. 2, March 2006








In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel arises when firms' marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing additional empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for monetary policy trade-offs, the objectives of monetary policy, and the effects of shocks on the economy under optimal discretionary and optimal commitment policies. We show that the presence of a cost channel alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and fiscal shocks under optimal monetary policy.

Technical Appendix

Extended Working Paper version: The Cost Channel in a New Keynesian Model: Evidence and Implications








Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy joint with Richard Dennis (Updated May 2007)
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Controls, Vol. 32 n. 6, June 2008








When central banks set monetary policy they do so without knowing either the economy's true structure or its parameterization. As a consequence, to set policy efficiently central banks must infer, or learn, the relevant structural relationships from available data. But, because a central bank's policy changes economic outcomes, the chosen policy may help or hinder its efforts to learn. This paper considers a variety of economic environments, examining whether real-time learning allows a central bank to learn the economy's underlying structure. When monetary policy is formulated as an optimal discretionary targeting rule we find that the rational expectations equilibrium and the optimal policy are real-time learnable. This result is robust to a variety of assumptions concerning the private sector learning behaviour. Learning happens slowly by the very nature of the econometric problem faced by the central bank, and in general it is not affected by real-time optimal policy making. When policy is set with discretion learning can lead to better outcomes. We also find that learning occurs more quickly and is less costly if the central bank smooths interest rates.

Earlier working paper version: Learning to Set Policy Optimally, Ente Luigi Einaudi - Temi di Ricerca 43, August 2005








The Welfare Consequences of Monetary Policy and the Role of the Labor Market: a Tax Interpretation  joint with Carl Walsh  (June 2008)
Prepared for the Fifth International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, 26-27 June 2008.







We explore the nature of the distortions in sticky-price, labor market frictions models, and characterize the trade-offs faced by the monetary policymaker in terms of the missing tax instruments that would implement the first best. Our results show that neither inefficient Nash bargaining nor rigid wages alone justify deviations from price stability. Large welfare gains are available if the steady state of the economy is inefficient, and do not depend on the existence of inefficient wage dispersion. Therefore welfare outcomes can strongly benefit from the coordination between monetary policy and subsidy policies that affect the steady state. Finally, economies with more volatile labor flows, as the US, stand to gain more by deviating from price stability.







Unemployment, sticky prices, and monetary policy  joint with Carl Walsh (work in progress)







In this paper, we derive a simple two-equation model for monetary policy analysis in terms of inflation and unemployment that is consistent with sticky prices and search and matching frictions in the labor market. The parameters in the traditional Phillips curve linking inflation and unemployment depend on structural characteristics of the labor market. The resulting linear-quadratic framework displays richer dynamics than the sticky-price new Keynesian model based on Walrasian labor markets. We use the model to analyze monetary policy rules and optimal targeting rules. The structural characteristics of the labor market have important implications for optimal policy.







How to distinguish bad policies from bad luck (Updated July 2008)             







A central question in assessing the historical performance of macroeconomic policies is how to distinguish the economic volatility that is an efficient outcome given the exogenous shocks from the volatility resulting from suboptimal policymaking. Because shocks driving the business cycle are for a large share unobservable, policymakers' performance is difficult to evaluate. We propose a DSGE model-based methodology to evaluate from historical variables' volatility whether the policymaker has been using an optimal policy. The methodology is applied to assess the US monetary policy performance over the 1984-2005 period.







How Central Banks Learn the True Model of the Economy (June 2005)







Policy decisions affect economic outcomes, and the likelihood of observing a given state of the world. We investigate how policy choices affect learning of the true model of the economy when the policymaker's model is mis-specified. We ask under what conditions can the central bank learn the correct specification of the model describing the economy, and what is the impact of exogenous shocks and of adopting an optimal monetary policy on the speed of learning. Slow learning can occur simply because identifying the correct model at standard confidence levels requires a long data sample. We show that optimal monetary policy does not impair or slow down learning when compared to simple Taylor rules.









European Monetary Union and Open Economy Monetary Policy







Monetary Policy Choice in Emerging Market Economies: the Case of High Productivity Growth (Updated May 2007) joint with Fabio Natalucci
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 40, n. 2-3, March/April 2008








We develop a general equilibrium model of an emerging market economy where productivity growth differentials between tradable and non-tradable sectors result in an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate---the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect. The paper explores the dynamic properties of this economy and the welfare implications of alternative policy rules. We show that the real exchange rate appreciation limits the range of policy rules that, with a given probability, keep inflation and exchange rate within predetermined numerical targets. We also find that the Balassa-Samuelson effect raises significantly the welfare loss associated with policy rules that prescribe active exchange rate management.







The Euro as a Commitment Device for New EU Member States  (Updated February 2008)
ECB Working Paper 156, and Austrian National Bank Working Paper 98







We argue a fixed exchange rate can be an optimal choice even if a policymaker could commit to the first-best monetary policy whenever the private sector's believes reflect incomplete information about the policymaker's dependability. This model implies that new EU member states have an incentive to join the Euro area not for its impact on the behaviour of the policymaker, but on the believes of the private sector. Monetary policies are evaluated using a new Keynesian model of a small open economy solved under imperfect policy credibility. We quantify the maximum distance between announced policy and private sector's believes necessary for an independent monetary policy to perform better than a peg when the policymaker can commit to the first best policy. Exposure to foreign and financial shocks make joining the Euro area relatively more attractive for a given level of credibility.







International Trade Patterns and the Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime on the Road to the Euro (work in progress)







Using a stochastic business cycle model of a small open economy we ask how the problem of the optimizing policy-maker changes endogenously as the international trade structure is altered. We examine the implications of various assumptions on the pricing of the traded and non-traded goods, changes in the elasticities of substitutions between goods, the importance of intermediate goods, the weight of imported, traded and non-traded components of investment goods, the relevance of non-traded goods for the traded good production sector. The results show that the loss from pegging the exchange rate can be very large even for very open economies. Whether this is the case depends on the interaction between the sources of nominal frictions in the economy and the structure of international markets for goods. By using EU data to calibrate the model, we show that the large variance in exchange rate regimes currently adopted by new EU member countries - all aiming at joining the Euro area in the near future - is largely the endogenous response of optimizing policy-makers to the external trade and domestic production structure.









Inflation dynamics and DSGE modeling






Vacancies, Unemployment and the Phillips Curve  joint with Carl Walsh  (June 2008)
European Economic Review, Forthcoming







The canonical new Keynesian Phillips Curve has become a standard component of models designed for monetary policy analysis. However, in the basic new Keynesian model, there is no unemployment, all variation in labor input occurs along the intensive hours margin, and the driving variable for inflation depends on workers' marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption. In this paper, we incorporate a theory of unemployment into the new Keynesian theory of inflation and empirically test its implications for inflation dynamics. We show how a traditional Phillips curve linking inflation and unemployment can be derived and how the elasticity of inflation with respect to unemployment depends on structural characteristics of the labor market such as the matching technology that pairs vacancies with unemployed workers. We estimate on US data the Phillips curve generated by the model. While we can reject the baseline new Keynesian Phillips curve in favor of the search-frictions specification, we show it is still too stylized to fully describe the dynamics of firms' marginal costs.







Menu Costs at Work: Restaurant Prices and the Introduction of the Euro joint with Bart Hobijn and Andrea Tambalott

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121:3, August 2006








Restaurant prices in the Euro area saw an unprecedented increase after the introduction of the Euro. We argue that this increase can be explained by an extension of commonly used models of sticky prices due to menu costs. This extension involves the state-dependent decision of firms on when to adopt the Euro. Two main mechanisms drive the result. First, our model concentrates otherwise staggered price increases around the introduction of the Euro. Second, before the adoption of the Euro, prices do not reflect marginal cost increases expected to occur after the changeover. This ``horizon effect'' disappears as soon as the new currency is adopted, contributing to a jump in prices at that time. Calibration of the model shows that it generates a blip in inflation of the same magnitude observed in the data.

Mathematical Appendix

Comments on the Italian Press: La Stampa, Il Messaggero, Italia OggiIl Mattino, La Sicilia, La Gazzetta Del Sud, Wall Street Italia, Il Denaro, Greenplanet








Vector Autoregressions and Reduced Form Representations of DSGE models  (Updated May 2006)

Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54 N. 7, October 2007








The performance of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models is often tested against estimated VARs. This requires that the data-generating process consistent with the DSGE theoretical model has a finite-order VAR representation. This paper discusses the assumptions needed for a finite-order VAR(p) representation of a DSGE model to exist. When a VAR(p) is only an approximation to the true VAR, the truncated VAR(p) may return largely incorrect estimates of the impulse response function. The results do not hinge on small sample bias or on incorrect identification assumptions. But the bias introduced by truncation can lead to bias in the identification of the structural shocks. Identification strategies that are equivalent in the true VAR representation perform differently in the approximating VAR.

Expanded Working Paper Version: Banco De Espana Working Paper, Forthcoming, Vector Autoregressions and Reduced Form Representations of DSGE models








Monetary Policy and Rejections of the Expectations Hypothesis joint with Juha Seppala (Updated May 2007)
Revise and Resubmit - Journal of Monetary Economics







We study the rejection of the expectations hypothesis within a New Keynesian business cycle model. According to Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989), the Lucas general equilibrium asset pricing model can account for neither sign nor magnitude of average risk premia in forward prices, and is unable to explain rejection of the expectations hypothesis. We show that a New Keynesian model with habit-formation preferences and a monetary policy feedback rule produces an upward-sloping average term structure of interest rates, procyclical interest rates, and countercyclical term spreads. In the model, as in U.S. data, inverted term structure predicts recessions. Most importantly, a New Keynesian model is able to account for rejections of the expectations hypothesis. Contrary to Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), we identify systematic monetary policy as a key factor behind this result. Rejection of the expectation hypothesis can be entirely explained by the volatility of just two real shocks which affect technology and preferences.







Monetary Policy, Expected Inflation and Inflation Risk Premia joint with Juha Seppala (Updated July 2007)
Revise and Resubmit - Journal of Macroeconomics







We study variables that are normally unobservable, but very important for the conduct of monetary policy, expected inflation and inflation risk premia, within a New Keynesian business cycle model. We solve the model using a third-order approximation which allows us to study time-varying risk premia. Our model is consistent with rejection of the expectations hypothesis and the business-cycle behavior of nominal interest rates in the U.S. data. We find that inflation risk premia are very small and display little volatility. Hence, monetary policy authorities can use the difference between nominal and real interest rates from index-linked bonds as a proxy for inflation expectations. Moreover, for short maturities current inflation is a good predictor of inflation risk premia. We also find that short-term real interest rates and expected inflation are significantly negatively correlated and that short-term real interest rates display greater volatility than expected inflation. These results are consistent with empirical studies that use survey data and index-linked bonds to obtain measures of expected inflation and real interest rates. Finally, we show that our economy is consistent with the Mundell-Tobin effect, that is, increases in inflation are associated with higher nominal interest rates, but lower real interest rates.







The Impact of Inflation Targeting: Testing the Good Luck Hypothesis (updated June 2008)






Over the last twenty years the level and volatility of inflation decreased across industrial countries. The inflation behaviour can be explained by a shift in monetary policy or by a lucky period of low volatility in business cycle shocks. To test the 'luck hypothesis' we examine the inflation experience of Canada, one of the earliest and most successful adopter of an inflation targeting monetary policy. We Kalman-filter the historical structural shocks consistent with an estimated DSGE model, but allow for part of the variance in the data to be explained by a vector of non-structural random innovations. The estimated DSGE model shocks are used to build counterfactual histories. Ex-ante the estimated model predicts inflation volatility to more than halve under inflation targeting. But conditional on the shocks, we show that the luck hypothesis can explain with a high probability Canada's low inflation volatility since the early 1990s. Any inflation stabilization induced by the shift in policy is accounted for the most part by the impact on expectations. Counterfactuals built neglecting expectations would prove the inflation targeting policy irrelevant.










Financial and currency crises








Financial Crises and Market Crashes: Herds or Coordination Failures?






Which equilibrium should be selected in a game with multiple Nash equilibria ? This paper proves under what conditions the strategy of a large population of randomly coupled players engaging in a one-stage game converges in time to a Nash equilibrium, and if so, to which of the different ones. Extending Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) results, I introduce a flexible setup where the individual strategy choice is explicitly modeled, where the population dynamics is derived from the aggregation of the individual behaviour, and where a variety of selection and learning mechanisms can be easily introduced. This setup can be used for a novel explanation of market crashes. The model generates herding among agents choice, with the same observational features of similar phenomena produced by social learning, information-driven models.







When do Financial Crises Happen? Dynamic Externality as a Source of Global Instability (work in progress)






This paper explains equilibrium selection in repeated plays of a coordination game in the presence of small stochastic shocks, and uses this mechanism to model currency and financial crises. It provides a novel explanation for market crashes. In the model the economy will spend most of its time fluctuating about the stable state, but spontaneous transitions will occur to a different stable state, without any aggregate shock affecting the economy. Due to the presence of nonlinear interactions the effects of many small independent shocks affecting all agents, usually inconsequential, need not cancel out: they can instead produce large fluctuations in the economy. Agents interact by considering the utility of their investment decreasing in the number of investors who have already abandoned investments in the same currency. A small negative random shock will make them switch investment currency if many others have already switched. This behaviour may determine a currency crisis, depending on the sensitivity of the single investors to the actions of all the others.


Invited Papers, Comments and Conference discussions








"A Macroeconomic Perspective on Reserve Accumulation" by Avner Bar-Ilan and Nancy Marion,  Review of International Economics - Santa Cruz Center for International Economics Conference on "Global Liquidity", 11-12 April 2008, Santa Cruz, CA.

"The Recessionary Impact of Stabilizing Inflation" in Recessions: Prospects and Developments, Nerea M. Pérez and June A. Ortega, eds., Nova Science Publishers, October 2008 (invited paper)

"Asset Prices and Economic Activity in an Era of Credible Monetary Policy (and Bubbles)", India Economy Review  4, September 2007 (invited paper)

"Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes: a Trap?" by Joshua Aizenman and Reuven Glick, SCCIE Conference on Applied International Finance, 5 December 2005, Santa Cruz, CA.

"Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention" by Bartosz Mackowiak and Mirko Wiederholt, Third ECB-IMOP Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics, 10-11 June 2005, Hydra, Greece.

"Robust Monetary Policies in a Small Open Economy" by Kai Leitemo and Ulf Soderstrom, UCSC-SCCIE Conference on 'The Implications of Uncertainty and Learning for Monetary Policy', 1 April 2005, Santa Cruz, CA.

"Optimal Monetary Policy in Two Basic Sticky-Price Models" by Robert King, Optimal Monetary Policy session, 2004 AEA Annual Meeting, January 2-5, San Diego, CA.

"Currency Boards, Dollarized Liabilities and Monetary Policy Credibility" by Mark Spiegel and Diego Valderrama, Journal of International Money and Finance/Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation/Santa Cruz Center for International Economics/Deutsche Bank 2003 Conference on 'Regional and International Implications of the Financial Instability in Latin America', April 11-12, University of California-Santa Cruz, CA

"Discerning What is too Tight" by Kenneth Kuttner and Adam Posen, North American Journal of Economics and Finance 2003 CMC Workshop on 'The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation and the Prospects for Global Deflation', April 25-26, McKenna College, Claremont, CA


























Conferences and Workshops

The Euro and the Dollar in a Globalized Economy

May 27, 2006
University of California - Santa Cruz

Jointly presented by the Santa Cruz Center for International Economics at UCSC,  the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, the Center for European Integration Studies at Bonn University

Sponsored by the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, DC
Program and papers available at the website of the:

                                                                                                                                   


The Implications of Uncertainty and Learning for Monetary Policy

April 1, 2005
University Center, UC Santa Cruz

Organized by Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh , UCSC
Sponsored by Santa Cruz Center for International Economics

Program and papers available at the website of the:












Research Links

The European Monetary Union Home Page by Giancarlo Corsetti








Global Macroeconomics and Financial Policy Site by Nouriel Roubini






Reference: Lars Svensson's homepage links






Reference: AEAweb Resources for Economists on the Internet