Politics 177 (Spring 2004): America and the World

Week 4: Realist Roots--Shock and Awe

4/20: Power in Theory and Practice

I. What is power?

"The elementary truth that seems to elude the experts again and again -- Gulf War, Afghan war, next war -- is that power is its own reward. Victory changes everything, psychology above all. The psychology in the region is now one of fear and deep respect for American power." 
(Charles Krauthammer, "Victory Changes Everything,"  Washington Post, 11/30/01, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A36680-2001Nov29&notFound=true)

1. The purposes of power: power is generally understood as a means, rather than an end--it is a tool in trying to achieve or acquire what one wants, whether that is dominance, land or resources.  But we assume that what we (or others) want has some purpose--security, interests, health, welfare--for whomever wields the power.  When some claims that "power is its own reward," the implication is that power can be used for some purpose. 

i. Power as force or influence: The most common understanding of power is along the lines of "getting B to do what A wants, even if B does not want to do it."  Power is, thus, a form of coercion, which threatens B's failure to do what A desires with costs of some sort, whether that be physical punishment, deprivation, or something else.  The problem here is that B might simply refuse to do what A wants, in spite of force.  This is evident, for example, in Iraq, where insurgents face overwhelming force yet continue to fight.  Military force does not, unequivocally, provide power.

ii. Structural power: Some actors--mostly states--are authorized to create, shape and maintain the rules and relations within which we act.  Such actors are assumed to be recognized as legitimate and to act in some sort of social interest.  States can also play a central role in the creation, or reinforcement, of customs, traditions, rituals and other practices, which also serve to shape and regulate social life.  People are compelled, and even coerced, to follow these various rules in order to remain members in good standing.  Often, but not always, these structures are encoded in the law.

iii. Institutional power: The frameworks within which people interact with each other are governed by rules and regulations, too, but these tend to specify "how the game is played" or "how the institution operates."  The rules of conduct and business within the university, for example, specify all kinds of processes and procedures that must be followed by those who are part of the institution.  These are structural within the context of the university, but apply only within the university, and have little compulsion outside.

iv. Discursive power: This is the realm of social power--in which language, symbols, and culture operate in ways that generate identities, relationships, and movements, among other things.  Joe Nye's "soft power" has a lot to do with this; the "power" of example is important here; the generation of collective mobilization often begins with discursive power.

2. Really-existing power: Power is generally a combination of these elements and, unlike military force, it is not something that can be stockpiled for future use.  The United States has used military force in Iraq in order to coerce people to acknowledge its legitimacy in structuring the new Iraqi system.  According to the plan, this system will be a market democracy, governed by laws, in which political parties will compete for votes while businesses compete for dollars.  The Iraqi people will generate productive power through their participation in this system, which will make them citizens of the new democracy and which will legitimate it.  At least in theory.

II. Hard power and soft power

1. The utility and disutility of force: Force, as noted above, is not the same as power.  War involves pitting forces against each other, in the view that the winning party achieves authority and legitimacy through victory and the right to dictate terms to the loser.  But that outcome is by no means guaranteed, as seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Israel has "won" time and time again, and continues to apply force against the Palestinians, who refuse to be coerced or influenced into giving up.  Indeed, Israeli force has strengthened Palestininan identity in such ways, and to such a degree, that no amount of force seems likely to achieve an Israeli victory.  Nuclear weapons are another example of the disutility of force: to use them could mean losing everything of any value.  Is that power or nihilism?

2. Power vs. authority: An "authority" is an actor whose right to command and control is acknowledged by those who are the objects of that authority.  The power to get people to do things resides, therefore, in people's willingness to believe and do whatever that authority orders.  This is less costly and arduous than using coercion, the direct use of which is not (generally) a legitimate form of authority  If an authority issues absurd or unreasonable orders, people are likely to question or challenge them, which undermines authority.  Hence, a legitimate authority will always regulate its exercise of power in order to maintain its authority.

3. Exemplar and desire: Getting others to want to do something is, in many ways, the most desirable form of power.  This is the "soft power" of which Joseph Nye writes.  The "power source" deliberately fashions its images and actions in ways that communicates and creates a desire in those to be influenced.  People see something they would like to emulate, and they change their behavior accordingly.  The problem here is that it is often difficult to fashion the "product" so that it will have the desired effect: American films and goods might communicate the desirability of "being American," but it could equally well create a sense of revulsion in the recipient. 

4. Gramsci and hegemony: Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist of the 1920s, argued that the best arrangement, from the perspectives of the ruling class, is for the masses to follow because they believe they are engaged in doing what is best for them (this is a form of, but not identical with, Marx's "false consciousness").  For example, when workers benefit from a system of production that increases their well-being (as did Fordism), they follow and support capitalism and its practices, even if objectively and in the long run doing so is not to their benefit.  Gramsci argued, in effect, that the only way to overturn such an exercise of power was for a "counter-hegemonic bloc" to create a parallel society and be prepared to take state power when the opportunity offered itself.

III. Power and markets

1. The frontier in capitalism and American history: Although we this of the "frontier" as marking the boundary between "civilization" and the "howling wilderness," it also serves other functions and symbols.  In capitalism, a "commodity frontier" indicates a region or range of goods that has not yet been penetrated by or incorporated into the market system.  Thus, for example, international trade in body organs could constitute a commodity frontier.  In power terms, a "frontier" marks a region in which there is a "vacuum," that is, there is no authority able to maintain order and rule.  In terms of U.S. expansion, the frontier is any region in which American business has not been able or permitted to penetrate and commercialize.  "Expanding the frontier" does not, therefore, necessarily imply military occupation; it can also involve incorporation into the U.S. economic system (as Williams points out).  More on this, below.

2. Pushing on the Open Door: The "Open Door" therefore comes to represent entry into new commercial frontiers.  The implication is not that others have not already entered these regions but that American business has been denied entry or is discriminated against.  For example, a European power with a sphere of influence in China or Turkey as a result of a treaty arrangement might impose onerous restrictions on non-nationals doing business in those spheres.  By using its growing economic prowess as a lever, the United States demanded both equal access to these areas and equal treatment for its companies.  At the same time, the U.S. was not above imposing such restrictions on others within its sphere of influence (especially Latin America).

3. Specters of revolution: The Open Door, along with "Dollar Diplomacy," also demanded that countries respect property rights and maintain financial order within their borders.  Inasmuch as foreign businesses found it most expedient to interact with economic and political elites in host countries, business arrangements and investments tended to reinforce existing domestic power structures, social hierarchies and economic inequities.  Anything that threatened to upset or overturn these systems came to be regarded as threats to U.S. business interests.  Insofar as these threats generally arose from the left, and involved revolutions, the United States became an active opponent of revolutionary activities and forces.  Between about 1890 and 1939, American intervention in Latin America occurred some 30-40 times, almost always in terms of protecting economic interests.  This pattern continued, as we shall see, during the Cold War and even after.

4. Force and power in structuring the economic frontier: The most conspicuous exercise of power and the Open Door was probably during the two World Wars.  In neither case was the security and survival of the United States demonstrably at risk--even when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.  Consequently, the problem was framed as "can the United States survive as a deomcratic society if Europe and Asia are totalitarian?"  The implications here were:

i.  The loss of European and Asian markets and raw materials would almost surely result in an even greater economic collapse than the Great Depression,  since American industry and prosperity both relied to a substantial degree on imports and exports;

ii. Adjusting to the loss of Europe and Asia would almost surely require greater state involvement in economic planning, which would also reduce domestic freedom and might even require high degrees of market control and direction of individual activities.

Consequently, continued prosperity required expanding the frontier, protecting American investments, and preventing assaults on that frontier, even if it required war, as seen in the case of both World Wars.

IV. Realism as philosophy and practice

1. The failure of idealism: Until World War One, there was a popular and influential line of thought, advocated most famously by Norman Angell, which argued that growing economic exchange would also contribute to world peace.  This claim had two primary elements: (i) trade bred familiarity and trust, so that formerly hostile nations would realize they had nothing to fear from each other, and (ii) the cost of a war would be so great as to result in business pressure on governments to avoid one at whatever cost.  Along with this went the idea that democratic electorates would never support war since they would see it only in terms of personal loss.  Prior to the Great War, in 1913, economic exchange among the future combatants was at levels it would not return to until the 1980s but, when the call came, so did war.  Thus was liberal idealism discredited.

2. Realism and empiricism: Between the wars, what came to be called "realism" replaced idealism.  Realism is linked most strongly to empiricism, the idea that there is an objective, measurable world against which one can gauge the utility of alternative course of action.  Realism came to be measured in terms of power--how many warships, how many men under arms--as well as other indicators of capability.  The best known advocate of realism was W.H. Carr, a British marxist, who wrote The 20 Years' Crisis but, after World War II, realism became the focus and fetish of American scholars.

3. Realism and realpolitik: The two should be distinguished.  Realpolitik, practiced by European statesmen during the 19th and 20th centuries, exemplified in the diplomacy of Metternich, analyzed and applied by Henry Kissinger between 1950 and 1975, involved the mutual assessment of states' needs and desires, and the adjustment of one's foreign policies to each other.  Realpolitik is the corollary to the "balance of power," in that it does not seek to overwhelm through force but to match power against power so as to minimize the risks of war (and it was discredited after 1976 under attack by neo-conservative as well as liberal idealogues).  Realpolitik was also seen as immoral or amoral--"politically expedient but 'morally' suspect," as Chace puts it.  Realism, by contrast, was defined by Hans Morgenthau, the dean of U.S. scholars of International Relations, in the following terms: "We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out." (Politics Among Nations, Brief Edition, p.5).  As we shall see, such empiricism (and amorality) did not survive in policy or practice.

4.  Realism as ideology: Morgenthau made two other observations worth quoting.  First, he wrote that "A realist theory of international politics...will guard against two popular fallacies:  the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences."  This was so because "Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws.  It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing truth and opinion--between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking."  (see: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm).  The problem here is that, insofar as others might articulate their motives and desires without reference to such "objectivity'--and there is no reason to think that they do otherwise--a "realist" approach to the world is likely to prove both dysfunctional and dangerous.  Moreover, not being able to willing to discern or divine motives and preferences, one is likely to rely on oneself as the benchmark for rationality and objectivity, thereby projecting oneself onto the opponent, for example, expecting the Iraqis to (i) act like Germans at the end of World War II and (ii) thinking they would greet the Americans as liberators.



4/22: Using Power to Make the World Safe for Democracy (and Capitalism)

I. Opening Doors and Closing Windows

1. Domestic stability and foreign markets: Recall the argument that domestic social stability relied on finding markets for surplus agricultural and industrial goods, and that this required pushing the U.S. frontier beyond the boundaries of the country.  The key issue was to find ways of selling abroad in order to accumulate gold, on the one hand, and to have sufficient bullion to pay for imports of raw materials, on the other.

2. Forcing doors open in the developing world: Because other European countries were often already doing business in developing countries, and some countries also tried to impose restrictions on imports, exports, foreign companies and investment, the Open Door was presented as a "fair" approach to competition and access.  But the Open Door also assumed superior American economic strength in relation to both the host country and others.

3. A history of interventions: Strict financial accounting is learned, not innate, and the  sanctity of property rights is not a natural law.  Hence, when governments were unable to maintain stability, failed to protect foreign property, or refused to honor economic contracts, coercion and intervention were common.  This was especially the case in Latin America, which was considered to be within the United States' "sphere of influence."

4. The challenge of economic nationalism: The penetration of national economies by foreign finance came with costs.  In particular, the upper classes tended to benefit from collaboration with outsiders, while the lower classes did not.  The political unrest this sometimes generated could be translated into revolutionary action and economic nationalism.  Being shut out of foreign markets was a central concern of U.S. economic and political elites and was, for example, a major factor in the outbreak of the War in the Pacific (World War II).

II. Woodrow Wilson and His Discontents

1. Wilson's Global Mission: Wilson was a global Calvinist--he believed the United States was the exemplar nation, that its mission was to transform the world, and that it could shape international institutions in such a way as to accomplish this end.  What was lacking, until World War I, were the public support and the means to do so.  When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the opportunity presented itself.  The United States was not a full member of the Western Allies--instead, in order to keep itself out of the alliance system, it was an "Associated Power."  Wilson saw the system of secret treaties and alliances that led into the war as symptomatic of the evil of the balance of power and, more generally, of Europe.

2. Wilson's commitment to self-determination: He was strongly-committed to national self-determination--but only for whites--as an extension of the liberal commitment to individualism.  To this end, he favored the breakup of the Continental European empires--Germany, Austro-Hungary, Ottoman, Russian--and their replacement by national states.  He did not object to Britain and France retaining their empires, nor did he favor self-determination in Africa or Asia.  Wilson was, in fact, quite racist and racialist.  Note, moreover, that small countries are easier to dominate than large ones.

3. Power and principles: Wilson's blueprint for the League of Nations relied on "collective security": rather than having Great Powers balance against one another, they would collectively suppress any threats to peace.  Wilson believed that America's role in the Allied victory would give it enough cachet to shape the League, which would then have the authority to pursue collective security.  The Versailles Treaty was not framed in terms of the League's goals, however: it favored the victors and punished the losers and failed to acknowledge that Germany, in particular, was essential is collective security were to work.  And, of course, the U.S. Senate refused to support the League, thereby withdrawing whatever structural power the country might have had in terms of international politics.

4. The curse of Wilsonian idealism: Wilson's mistakes were not repeated after World War II, when the United States used its authority and structural power to shape the post-war international institutions, and backed that up with force and influence.  But the notion of national self-determination ran aground on the shoals of sovereignty, security and the national mission.  As Henry Kissinger said of Chile,

 "I don't see why we need to  stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people."

Whenever a country appeared ready to pursue national autonomy, its actions were interpreted as being revolutionary and requiring military intervention or support for proxy forces.  Given that such interventions were frequently failures, and often led to gross abuses of human rights, the "curse of Wilsonian idealism" does not appear to be a fiction.  

III. Power in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1776-2004

1. Forms of power: Power is, first and foremost, a collective phenomenon.  It must involve more than one person or more than one state.  The forms of power that a country has at its disposition depend on two factors: (i) recognition by others that it possesses those forms of power; and (ii) the capacity to exercise that power productively.  Thus, although military force is seen as the quintessential form of power, its actual application can be seen as a failure of power.  We can imagine, for example, laying waste to the city of Falluja in order to suppress the insurgents there, but whether this would generate the kind of influence we desire is not at all clear.

2. The first 100 years: Until the United States began to expand beyond North America, it mostly exercised "productive power," and mostly in the domestic context.  As the "exemplar nation," others were expected to see it as an ideal, to be imitated and emulated.  That this did not, for the most part, happen is largely due to the relative lack of capacity in terms of the other forms of power.  The Spanish-American War represented the first real external exercise of military force, but it was also based on the assertion of structural power through the Monroe Doctrine and its extension into the Pacific.

3. Developing the power to shape and rule: The first real effort to shape international structure came with Wilson's plan for the League of Nations.  This failed, however, because there was little social support for the expenditure of American resources to maintain the League.  Moreover, Wilson believed that institutions alone could keep the peace.  This failure was not repeated in the founding of the United Nations.

4. The Cold War and after: The United States was able to use its authority to structure the international political economy in which institutions could operate.  The Soviet "threat" (of which more, next week), was more as an alternative system than a problem of "national security," and containment could be seen as an institutional solution rather than a military one.  The Bretton Woods system broke down in the 1970s due to a decline in American structural authority, and was never replaced.  After 1975, the Second Cold War became the structure within which neoliberal globalization developed.  With the end of the Cold War, however, structural authority disappeared, once again,  and "soft power" meant a declining ability to shape the global political economy.  The Bush Administration, however, has come to rely on direct power rather than structural authority to shape the contemporary global political economy.  This lacks both authority and legitimacy.

 

Time period

Direct power

Structural

Institutional

Productive

 

1776-1897

War with Mexico,  1846-1848

Monroe Doctrine

 

United States as exemplar to the world

 

1897-1899

Spanish-American War

 

U.S. interests in Latin America

 

 

1900-1940

Intervention in WWI, 1917-1919

 

Open Door, League of Nations

 

 

1941-1945

World War II

Bretton Woods planning

United Nations

Atlantic Charter, 1940

 

1946-1971

Korean War, Vietnam War

Bretton Woods framework

Containment

Leader of the Free World

 

1972-1976

 

Détente

Int’l economic management

 

 

1976-1989

 

Second Cold War; defeat of the NIEO

 

Neo-liberalism

 

1990-2000

 

Unipolarity

Multilateral globalization

“Soft Power”

 

2001-2004

Domination

Imperial rules

Imperial globalization

Leader of the Free World