Politics 177 (Week 3): Materialist Roots

Politics 177 (Spring 2004): America and the World

Week 3: Materialist roots—The Protestant Ethic and economic expansion

4/13: Sin, Salvation and Success

I. What is materialism?

Idealism<-----> Power & Authority<----> Materialism

1. Materialism can be understood it at least four ways:

(i) In the marxian sense, it has to do with the ways in which systems of production determine social relations-- for example, in the sense that the capitalist's ownership of the "means of production" create a particular relationship with labor that, in turn, impacts both the household and the state.

(ii) In an empiricist sense, it has to do with the ways in the physical world affects or determines human behavior--for example, in the sense that national defense requires the control of certain geographic features of the earth, such as straits or peninsulars, or sites of natural resources, such as oil fields.

(iii) In the liberal sense, it has to do with both the physical results of economic activity and the effects of those physical results on economic activity, for example, the building of the transcontinental railroads opened up vast lands to settlement and agriculture which, in turn, produced surpluses of grain that motivated the search for external markets.

(iv) Finally, in the biological sense, it posits a form of natural determinism as it appears in some versions of evolutionary theory--that is, humans represent the determined endpoint of evolution, and some peoples are more evolved than others. Social Darwinism framed this in terms of nations as well as competition in the market. This proved offensive to many Christians, for it seemed to reduce God's role in the human future.

2. From the traditional Christian perspective, the material world is the realm of sin and suffering, and one must bear the burden as the price of paradise in the hereafter. But the eschatology of Christianity, especially as articulated in the New Testament's Revelation of St. John, posits not merely the existence of Heaven but also the possibility of a material Paradise under Christ. One of the theological and social debates that appears in Christianity is: can the actions of human beings, on Earth, hasten the return of Christ?

3. The material success of the American project sharpened this debate, for it challenged the notion that the "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for the rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God." (Matthew 19:24). The Calvinists resolved this dilemma by arguing that material success in this world was linked to predestination and salvation in the next. By the 18th century, the degree of well-being throughout the colonies seemed to indicate a lot of salvation going on. The resolution was to claim that the individual could engage in "good works" which, along with material success, assured salvation.

4. Personal success linked up with the example of America as "the City on the Hill" and, during the mid-1800s, with the shift from exemplar to missionary. The Louisiana purchase, the Spanish agreement to give up the Florida territory, the annexation of the northern half of Mexico and Texas, and westward expansion were all seen as part of both Manifest Destiny and the extension of national prosperity.

5. During the late 19th century and into the 20th, then, we begin to see how economic success and the dissemination of American-style capitalism displaces the missionary impulse, and becomes the dominant goal. National success in the Social Darwinist sense becomes focused on economic competition and articulated in the concept of the "National Interest."

II. Materialism and the American economy

1. As the U.S. expanded westward into a Jeffersonian realm of yeoman farmers, the economic expansion of the eastern part of the country, into a Hamiltonian industrial power proceeded, too. The cities grew as immigrants from Europe and Asia arrived in the millions, to provide the cheap labor needed to support the material infrastructure and its growth. The railroads were not built by those whose forebears had been in the country for generations.

2. The opening of the west helped to transform the national economy from a series of isolated and fragmented markets into a national one. The wiring of the continent with telegraphy and the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 made long-distance exchange possible. Land grants to railroads were turned into settlement projects with the idea that farmers would use the railroads to ship their produce back east. The railroads, in turn, used their monopoly positions to extract high revenues from farmers, which forced poorer ones out of business and richer ones to produce more and more efficiently.

3. Following the Civil War, American grain entered into the world market in a large way. Although commodity exports did not constitute a major fraction of the overall economy, they were critical to avoiding domestic surpluses which put downward pressure on commodity prices and were very bad, in particular, for farmers. Because the rural electorate still constituted a majority, electoral success was highly dependent on the well-being of farmers.

4. At the same time as the export market came to occupy such a critical role in domestic politics, other new lands were being opened up and they, too, were exporting commodities. The U.S. went through economic depressions during the 1870s and an even worse one during the 1890s. The combination of unhappy farmers, poorly-paid workers, Robber Baron corporations and the "closing of the American frontier" (more a myth than a realisty) produced a potent and explosive political brew. As William Appleman Williams makes clear, politicians and the economic elite worried about instability, class conflict and even revolution, if some solution to this problem were not found.

5. As we saw last week, and as McLoughlin discusses in the chapter on the "Third Great Awakening," (1890-1920), this period of economic and social stress corresponds to a major religious revival as well as two political movements: Populist and Progressive. The Spanish-American War, in 1898, and U.S. entry into WWI in 1917, to make the world "safe for democracy," also occurred during this period. And, finally, the great American oil companies moved out into the world even as the automobile made its first appearance.

III. Materialism and America's Global Mission

1. The growing reliance of the U.S. economy on foreign markets and stability went hand-in-hand with stabilization of the domestic economy. This was a difficult balancing act: Fordism--the combination of mass production on the factory line and wages sufficiently high to permit the workers to buy the products they made--was not yet the basis for the economy. Bankers and elites sought stability through the gold standard, which place limits on currency and credit and did not permit rapid domestic inflation during times of recession, while farmers and workers sought bimetallism as a means of increasing liquidity in the economy. The campaign for a combined gold and silver standard reached its peak in the 1896 presidential election, when William Jennings Bryan gave his famous "Cross of Gold" speech in which he begged the country not to "crucify mankind on a cross of gold."

2. The Populist movement, which generally supported bimetallism and nativism, and drew on Jeffersonian ideas about the individual farmer, was also linked to various strands of Christian evangelism. Populism gave rise to political parties and candidates and, for a time, appeared that it might challenge the hegemony of the two major parties. There is strong reason to think that the threat and fear of Populism was an important factor in the imperialist projects of the 1890s.

3. The Progressive movement was a protective reaction to Populism, emerging from the Third Great Awakening, on the one hand, and the fear of economic and political elites, on the other. The first gave rise to the Social Gospel, which argued against the idea of individual good works, success and salvation, and for collective action by the community of believers to help save the poor and weak and to eliminate predatory behavior by corporations. The second gave rise to the concept and practice of administrative efficiency and the elimination of waste and political corruption. Experts would bypass politics, while the referendum would allow the educated masses to make intelligent decisions. Politicians would be tamed and corruption eliminated. The Progressives also gave rise to political parties and made major inroads in the Midwest. Woodrow Wilson was elected President in 1912 only by virtue of Theodore Roosevelt's running as the candidate of the "Bull Moose" (aka, Progressive) Party.

4. Various labor movements contributed, too, to populism, albeit from a different angle. Socialism, communism, and anarchism were all powerful currents among workers, many of whom were immigrants. To capital and the state, unions were anathema, seen as the illegal withholding of wage labor and a threat to the capitalist's freedom to invest and profit. Strikes were met with violence, and organizers were arrested or deported. The fear of revolution--seen in various parts of Europe and, eventually, realized in Russia--ultimately led, after 1920, to growing recognition of unions and, after World War II, to their eventual incorporation into the Cold War social coalition.

5. Imperialism and markets went hand-in-hand in two respects: trade and finance. The first was articulated in the "Open Door" policy, the second in "Dollar Diplomacy." These are, respectively, the forerunners of "Free Trade" and "Structural Adjustment." Both of these policies were linked to the spread of American capitalism and liberalism, and justified as part of the civilizing process which would, in the longer term, make the world more receptive to and more like the United States.

(i) The "Open Door" was a policy first articulated with respect to China, which was seen as a vast and fertile field for both Christianity and capitalism. After dividing up Africa in 1885, the European empires, and Japan, turned their eyes to Asia and, in particular, China. They began to conclude treaties with the Chinese emperor to establish exclusive areas of trade and investment, a policy opposed by the United States, which wanted access to all of China without the bother of colonization. Through the Open Door notes, the U.S. got both the Europeans and China to agree that American business would receive equal treatment in all of China--and this then became the basis for economic penetration of China. Later, the Open Door was transformed into "Most Favored Nation" which involves treatment of foreign companies on the same basis as national ones and is linked to market access.

(ii) "Dollar Diplomacy" involved the use of private loans to extend U.S. influence over the economies of other countries, especially in Latin America. The U.S. government was not yet in the business of providing grants and loans to developing countries, and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, did not exist. At the same time, European countries were providing loans and supporting foreign investment. Dollar Diplomacy involved support for private loans from American banks to developing country governments, and the emplacement of American financial experts in the receipient country governments to oversee and manage expenditures, budgets, and revenue collection.

IV. The Specter Haunting Washington: Revolution

1. As noted above, and in the readings, the American fear of radicalism and communism was not something that began in 1946--it had a long history, beginning with concern about the consequences of the French Revolution. Of particular note was the Paris Commune of 1871, which appeared to auger the rising of the working classes and their desire to kill their masters. The Commune was put down, with much violence, but it resulted in the rebuilding of Paris by Baron Hausmann, who saw to the destruction of the poor and working class neighborhoods and their narrow streets, to be replaced by the broad, open boulevards of today.

2. The Commune coincided with the beginning of the Second Industrial Revolution in the United States, and the emergence of radical labor movements, who were further motivated by the series of economic recessions and depressions of the following 30 years. The fear was that the masses, impoverished and with few prospects, would mobilize, rise up and take control of the state. They would then confiscate the property of the middle and upper classes, and everyone would be reduced to penury. Labor unions were thought to be the means whereby this might happen.

3. Revolutions in developing countries were less threatening to the domestic power of the elites, but nonetheless did pose a threat to property and investment. This appeared to be the case in Cuba, where the indigneous anti-Spanish movement was encouraged by Americans but eventually displaced by Americans (the revolutionaries did not make the same mistake in 1958). In the Philippines, an indigenous movement fought the American occupation and it was put down only after some 200,000 Filipinos died.

4. Ultimately, the collapse of the German and Russian Empires, the appearance of short-lived communist regimes in Germany and Hungary, and the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia, confirmed the world fears of the Americans. Not only was property confiscated, the royal family was executed as were many nobles. The United States went so far as to join Britain and commit troops to the effort to defeat the Bolsheviks, but eventually withdrew them. Nevertheless, a Red Scare followed during the 1920s.

5. Throughout the period from roughly 1890 to 1935, the United States intervened in various countries--mostly in Latin America--over 30 times and, in some cases, occupied those countries for extended periods of time, trying to put and keep in power regimes that were favorable to U.S. interests. This established a pattern that continues until today.

4/15: Defining and Defending and the National Interest

"Prior to diplomacy is policy, which guides the diplomats in their actions; prior to policy are the ideas that inhabit the heads of the policymakers, shaping their perceptions of the world and informing their responses to those perceptions. Monarchs and dictators may manage to determine policy on the basis of narrow notions of personal self-interest, although most even of the autocratic sort persuade or delude themselves os a coincidence between self-interest and national interest. Democracies are hardly spared selfishness in their leaders, but democratic politics demand that policies be defended, even when they do not originate, in terms of national interest--of a conception of an overriding common good transcending the specific interestes of parties, factions, and other entities smaller than the nation as a whole." (H.W. Brands, "The Idea of the National Interest," p. 239).

I. Defining the "National Interest"

1. What constitutes a "national interest" (NI)? Ordinarily, the NI is associated with material things and their protection; this is necessary but not sufficient. The presumption is that the NI includes those practices, places and things that, somehow, are central to the nation's identity and conception of self. In the absence of those elements, some aspect of the nation's "wholeness" and integrity is absent or lost. At one level, it is in the NI for the population not to starve; at another level, it is in the NI for the people's "lifestyle" not to be disturbed. Between the two, there are a lot of possibilities. Hans Morgenthau tried to finesse the definitional problem by arguing for a NI "defined as power," on the assumption that power enables all things and accumulation of power offers a concrete objective for decisionmakers.

2. Who decides what is the NI? The most common approach to this question involves identification of those things without which the nation will suffer serious consequences. It is assumed that this is a straightforward process, and that one can even do a cost/benefit analysis. For example, protection of petroleum supplies and flows, and stable oil prices, are all consdered to be in the U.S. national interest. But what, exactly, does this mean in practice? Who would suffer, for example, if the price of gasoline were to rise to $10/gallon? Why could we not define conservation and renewables as constituting an NI? Why do we believe we cannot rely on markets to supply us with our requirements? What kinds of commitments and complications result from protecting this NI? And how does maintenance of those commitments-- force deployed in the Persian Gulf--then come to be a part of the NI?

3. What is the difference between the NI and "national security?" We have come to assume that the NI encompasses primarily economic interests that benefit the nation as a whole. National security (NS), as conceptualized in and after the National Security Act of 1947, sees not threats to interests but, rather, to the whole of the system. NI thus come to be encompassed in, but of lower priority, than NS. Threats to NS can originate from virtually anywhere: not only other countries with deadly weapons, but from foreign and domestic social forces, from the disturbance of various social support systems and infrastructures, even from diseases.

4. How do we resolve conflicts over differing conceptions and stakes? Because the NI is difficult to define, the policies to protect the NI are likely to be a focus of debate and conflict. What are the potential consequences of different strategies? Who benefits, who pays? How do different outcomes affect the balance of political, economic and social forces within a society? This can be seen quite clearly in the lead-in to and consequences of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.

II. History of an idea

1. The NI as a manifestation of state-building and nationalism. Let us consider the idea and role of the NI in structural terms, especially in the dual projects of state-building and development of a national consciousness. The NI, understood here as encompassing critical inputs to the economy, for example, thus becomes a central focus of the state's economic policies.   To the extent that these policies also foster national growth and prosperity, or become incorporated into public consciousness as essential to national success, the NI also constitutes an important element in nationalism. BUT NOTE THAT THE NI CAN BE SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY.

2. War in the NI. It is a relatively straightforward proposition to claim that the NI must be defended through war, even if it seems like a risky move. The policies of Spain in Cuba generated domestic resistance that, it was thought, threatened American investments and property in the island. Continued instability would not only undermine business, it also raised the possibility of large-scale refugee movements into the United States. Finally, the destruction of the Maine, whatever the cause, was held up as an affront to U.S. power and pride--it could not go unanswered. Hence, both economic and social ends seemed to be serve by the American declaration of war on Spain. It is possible to find similar language in reference to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, as well as the need to remain rather than withdraw.

3. The NI as a means of fostering social stability. As we have seen previously (and in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy), the expansive conception of the NI pointed toward exports and economic expansion as a means of reconciling he conflicting politics and desires of populists, progressives and workers. During World War One, moreover, the mobilizing power of a shared conception of the national interest--defeating the Hun, making the world safe for democracy--led to men marching readily marching off to war and people enthusiastically supporting the war effort.

4. Peace in the NI. Is peace in the NI? Here, the evidence is somewhat less clear. As H.W. Brand points out, during times of peace, people have the relative luxury of debating policies and objectives. As he puts it, when the country goes to war, "The divergent objectives among the war party are masked, once war is declared, by the overriding objective of winning the war; let peace approach, however, and the coalition begins to crumble. Put otherwise, while definitions of the national interest may differ going into war, these differences are suppressed in the immediate interest of victory. Once that immediate interest has been achieved, the divergence among the large definitions reappears." (p. 243)

III. History of the practice

1. Was territorial expansion and annexation in the NI? Until the United States established annexed California, it could be said that failure to occupy and settle the West would always pose a threat.   Britain, France, Spain and Russia all had claims on territories in North America, and their settlement of those regions could establish continental competitors (for a considerable time during the 19th century, the United States contemplated the eventual annexation of British North America, aka, Canada). Expansion fulfilled the terms of Manifest Destiny and, thus, the developing conception of the NI. But, territorial expansion beyond North America raised the question of citizenship for non-white peoples and racial mixing, and the NI seemed best served by not incorporating non-white regions (with the exception, of course, of Hawaii and Alaska, which did not become states until the late 1950s).

2. Penetration of foreign markets as a NI. Policies such as the Open Door, Dollar Diplomacy and the penetration of foreign markets thus came to substitute for territory-based imperialism--thus, it is said, the United States has never been "imperialistic." Yet, to ensure that markets are opened and remain open, and that governments be creditworthy and dependable, and that people "learn" to produce and consume, a fair degree of socialization into the U.S.-directed political economy was necessary. Justified as a process of "education," the United States could argue that the development of other economies was both in its NI as well as in the NI of the subject state.

3. The NI as a reflection of America's global mission. In the case of the United States, the global mission becomes a central element of the NI even as the NI is articulated, in part, through an understanding of the global mission. "Free markets and free men," under American tutelage, would remake the world and, in turn, would generate the demand for goods to be supplied by American factories and farmers. The NI thus required not so much the protection of certain resources or overseas investments as the spread of democracy and capitalism. This view changed during and after World War II, when NS came to subsume this view of the NI, and the latter was contrued more narrowly and economistically.

IV. Defending the National Interest

1. Is the NI only national? What about the interests of others? One problem with the expansive version of the NI is that economic subservience is not always in the interest of the subordinate country. Through the social coalitions required to establish and maintain this international division of labor, the domestic solidarity of the subordinate country is undermined--which also makes uprisings and revolutions more unlikely or difficult--and the interests of the wealthy and powerful come to be indentified with the NI. More to the point, what is in the NI of one state is often not in the NI of another, especially when it comes to protection of markets, trade and resources. Yet, when another country complains of violations of its NI by the dominant state, the latter often finds ways to blame the subordinate country for misunderstanding its patron or its interests.

2. Morality and defense of the NI. At least two problems arise in this respect. First, in our pursuit of the NI, to what degree ought we be concerned about the interests of others? Should we treat them as means or ends? Second, what is our obligation to act morally when we deal with others, especially if we must then give up on some aspect of the NI? A Christian nation can make the claim that activities undertaken in the name of spreading the Good Word are intrinsically moral, even if others are then treated as means. It is also possible to excuse such behavior by reference to the inferior qualities of others. For a secular state, this is a more difficult proposition: on what basis can judgements be made about what is moral and what is not? How can we justify placing our interests above those of others?

3. Power, realism and the NI. It is here that we begin to see the emergence of what we today call "realism," that is, the role of power in determining both foreign policy and the national interest. Questions of morality do not disappear entirely, but they are relegated to choices to be made only after the NI has been secured. Power stripped of moral considerations becomes a tool for achieving goals, and power is pitted against power. Morality can only lead to the weakening of power and the introduction of doubt into the national will.   On this basis, consequently, a kind of economistic logic takes over: who has the bigger missiles; who can make the bigger bang; what must be done to make sure ours are bigger and make the biggest bang of all.