Politics 177 (Week 9): Imperium

Politics 177 (Spring 2004): America and the World

Week 9: Imperium

5/25: Empire as Immanent Formation

I. What is "empire?"

1. Empire is often thought of in terms of territorial entities: Historically speaking, empires have involved conquest and rule by a core power of other territorial entities outside of the core power, for ideological, security or economic reasons. The precise form of historical empires, and the nature of rule, have differed among them, and over time.

2. Since the 19th century, "empire" has been associated with "imperialism": The latter term has come to mean the illegitimate extension of political and economic control by a core power over other political centers for the largely exclusive benefit of the core. Imperialism can include policies of genocide, conquest, exploitation of natives, land and resources, extension of core rule over conquered territories, and even attempts to assimilate native populations into the core. The most common definition is an economic one: the deliberate exploitation of conquered territories for the sole benefit of the core.

3. In 2000, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published Empire: Hardt and Negri conceptualized "empire" as a formation resulting from globalization. This did not involve the deliberate exercise or extension of military force to conquer, but the extension of economic practice and system throughout the world. In their view, "empire" was a product of American capitalism, but it was not the same as American political hegemony or military power.

4. Contemporary empire should be seen as a form of rule: In this instance, a set of rules and practices have been promulgated, through American hegemony, international institutions and the U.S. Congress, which lay out economic and political practices that subordinate states--that is, allies and others--are expected to follow. These rules are articulated through institutions such as the IMF and WTO as well as those of private capital, while the rules of proper political behavior are policed more-or-less directly by Washington. Those state that deliberately flout those rules are called "rogues" and are subject to disicpline and punishment.

II. Is the Bush Revolution or an executive recapitulation?

1. Contrary assessments: Daalder and Lindsay argue that George W. Bush is a "revolutionary"; Johnson, that Bush is continuing what has been developing over the past 60 years. Who is correct? The "revolution" appears to consist of a turn to unilateralism, preventative war, diktats, repudiation of international agreements, and a shift away from deterrence and containment (among other things). Johnson points out that the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, through basing abroad and takeover by the Defense Department, has been long in the making, and what has changed is emphasis.

2. A better way to consider these, and other analyses, is through consideration of U.S. "foreign policy space."

This represents the range of foreign policy positions reflected in the framework set up during the course. All Administrations choose a balance between nationalism and globalism (or "internationalism"), on the one hand, and multilateralism and unilateralism, on the other. As can be seen from the map, the lower left and upper right quadrants are the only really feasible ones.

3. Thus, it is the balance of the two variables that has changed: Overall, this foreign policy space is largely organized around American power--even the "UN System" is a variant on the U.S. political system. The primary question any President faces is: "Where in this policy space should I position my approach?" The secondary question is: "Do I emphasize faith or reason in foreign policy?"

4. Resistance to U.S. foreign policy is a common phenomenon: To what degree does the United States simply issue commands and demands, and to what extent does it negotiate and bargain with others? Johnson makes the case that the takeover of foreign policy by the Defense Department has resulted in a shift away from diplomacy and toward diktat. This is not terribly popular in Europe.

III. Coalitional politics and the triumph of idealism

1. The Bush Administration's foreign policy is the product of coalitional politics: There are three or four factions represented in the Administration:

(i) The more-or-less Traditional Internationalists, represented by Colin Powell and the Bush Senior faction, who are on the defensive because they are seen as "appeasers;"

(ii) The Revolution in Military Affairs guys, represented by Donald Rumsfeld, who wants to transform the military services, reduce manpower and labor costs, and increase the information component;

(iii) The Neo-conservative Defense of Israel faction, represented by Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, who seek to bring the Middle East into the democratic liberal sphere and thereby reduce the Arab threat to Israel; and

(iv) The Pentacostals and Cultural Conservatives, who resent the social changes of the past 40 years and seek to bring about the Second Coming, either secular or religious, as a means of undoing those changes.

2. There are, of course, others who support the Administration but have no particular political position: These include certain business groups, such as defense corporations and Silicon Valley, who benefit from increased defense spending, and the Homeland Security folk, including xenophobes, anti-immigrants, and those fearful of terrorism.

3. The resulting coalition is based heavily on idealism: There are material interests at stake here, but most of the primary groups see the "Greater Middle East Initiative" as a vision of what could be. Thus, although there are very real reasons for questioning the entire project, as well as its progress in Iraq, President Bush is asking his supporters and others to "have faith" in the ultimate success of the Iraq venture.

4. Can the coalition survive 2004? The central question is whether Iraq can or will be pacified after the June 30th handover to an interim government. No one yet knows what that means but, if the country does quiet down, the invasion will be presented as a success and the President can then concentrate on other issues. The problem for John Kerry is that he does not really have an alternative outside of bringing in the UN and, should he take office in January, 2005, and move in that direction, the Republicans in Congress will attack him fiercely for undoing George W. Bush's vision. Whatever the fate of the Coalition of Idealists, Iraq is a material reality that will not go away.

IV. The limits of imperialism

1. Can imperialism succeed in the 21st century? The United States has global material interests and has extended its reach to virtually all parts of the world. Inevitably, the degree to which America protects its interests and intervenes on their behalf will generate resentment, for cultural reasons, and resistance, as local interests are disturbed or displaced. Insofar as there are no state-based military challengers (for the time being), the likelihood of a War of Great Power Succession is small. But small insurgencies, as manifest in terrorist incidents, could cumulate into much broader socially-based violence.

2. What conditions are necessary for imperial success? Empire can succeed only if it is articulated through Gramscian hegemony, which is what the Clinton Administration was moving toward. This, however, requires a light hand, which does not sit well with many groups and interests in the United States.

3. What is educated wisdom on Empire? There are, of course, three schools of thought on this. On one side are people like British historian (now at Yale) Niall Ferguson, who thinks empire is perfectly fine and the U.S. should be more like Britain at its imperial apogee (although it will probably fail). On the other side are those on the right (Pat Buchanan) and left (Noam Chomsky) who, for different reasons, believe it is a terrible idea. Finally, in the center are the undecided and confused--John Kerry comes to mind--who would like to call it something else--perhaps as Thomas Barnett calls it, "disconnecting deconnectedness."

4. What is the likely outcome? Difficult to call. Some are already forecasting decline, as a result of the twin deficits (budget and balance of payments), while others believe that the general thrust can be maintained through a shift back toward greater leadership and multilateralism.

5/27: Discipline and Punish

I. Obedience and Empire

1. A working empire must instill discipline: It is expensive to garrison troops throughout the empire's reach--although Chalmers Johnson claims this is what has happened--which is why hegemony is preferable to domination. Discipline is achieved through a combination of carrots and sticks: if you behave, you will benefit; if you misbehave, you will be punished.

2. A neo-liberal empire has an additional problem: It relies on individual motivation to foster innovative forms of accumulation. Because of its class nature, the vast and growing middle class must believe that it can improve its status and wealth by going along with the program. Yet, there is no such solidarity entity as a "middle class," and benefits are distributed unevenly. Disorderly individuals can cause considerable disruption, and they are also difficult to track down.

3. Karl Polanyi pinpointed this problem in The Great Transformation: He argued that "self-regulation" was a fantasy and a threat to society. He described a "double movement" in capitalism that consisted of, first, an effort to reduce political regulation of markets (and individuals in civil society) in order to foster capitalist accumulation and growth and, second, a reaction that involved efforts by states to protect society against the injuries of unregulated markets. In the latter case, these efforts twice led to world war.

4. The latest "double movement" took place over the past 30 years: The first part involved the adoption and expansion of neo-liberalism as ideology and practice, and the effort to shift regulation to the international level. The second part consists of the imperial response to the injuries inflicted on society by Islamists: the War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. This is aimed not at states, as in the past, but at free individuals organized into terrorist networks. The paradox here is that many of these individuals are members of the "middle class" and deeply integrated into the global capitalist system (even Bin Laden was, after all, a son of the Saudi business sector).